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Introduction 
 
The events on September 11 can without a doubt be seen as one of the most defining 
moments of this millennium. The attacks on both the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
are considered as being the biggest terrorist attacks in history, ensuring the death of nearly 
three-thousand people. This bachelor thesis will however not specifically focus on these 
attacks, though it will employ the attacks to uncover the possible change in the behaviour of 
former president of the United States George W. Bush as a result of the events on 9/11. Two 
important theories will be used to study Bush’s behaviour in a systematic and objective way, 
namely Hermann’s Leadership Trait Analysis and the Operational Code Analysis that was 
mainly developed by Alexander George. Especially within the Leadership Trait Analysis, and 
to a lesser extent within the Operational Code Analysis, it is assumed that the leadership style 
of a political leader remains stable over time. This corresponds with the idea of cognitive 
consistency (McGregor, 2013, pp. 168-169). However, in recent years, there are more critical 
voices towards this idea. Several scholars have concluded that the behaviour of political 
leaders can change over time, for example because of role change, ‘learning’, or because of a 
traumatic event (Renshon, 2008; Walker, Schafer & Young, 1998; Feng, 2005). Building on 
Renshon (2008), this thesis will focus on if and how the personality of a political leader can 
change, especially in the aftermath of a traumatic event like 9/11. Additionally, both Bush’s 
traits and beliefs before and after the attacks will be compared to detect if similar patterns 
could be uncovered, believing that although the two aforementioned theories are often seen as 
being separate, they are in fact interrelated. The main goal of this research is not to give an 
irrefutable answer to the drafted research questions, but to provide more insights into the 
possibility of change within the leadership style and the operational code of a political leader. 
These insights could in turn give more information on how these theories can complement 
each other and possibly give a more comprehensive view of why political leaders choose to 
make specific foreign policy decisions. 
  
Literature review 
 
A lot of research within International Relations (IR) tends to ignore the role individuals can 
play on the world stage. Internal phenomena are often described using the second or third 
image, thus from the perspective of states (Byman & Pollack, 2001, p. 111; Hudson, 2005, p. 
2) or of the international system (Wendt, 1999, pp. 10-11). It is often argued that they do not 
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have an influence worth mentioning on the major events that model international politics 
(Byman & Pollack, 2001, p. 108). The state is then threated as if it were a black box, and as if 
actors within it, like political leaders, could not have any influence on it (Byman & Pollack, 
2001, p. 108; Hudson, 2005, p. 2). Furthermore, it is often thought that the international 
system is characterized by anarchism and interdependence between states, which limits the 
choices leaders have when they try to achieve their goals. From this rationale comes the belief 
that political leaders cannot have an individual impact that is worth mentioning and therefore, 
the first image cannot give a conforming explanation for international politics (Hermann & 
Hagan, 1998, p. 124). Besides, influential theories within IR, like (neo)realism, 
(neo)liberalism and constructivism assume that the beliefs and personalities of leaders simply 
reflect the foreign and domestic situations they face when they make their foreign policy 
decisions. For example, neoliberalists believe that international economic and political 
institutions limit the choices of those political leaders that participate within these institutions. 
These theories do not focus on the fact that beliefs are subjective and that people have 
different beliefs that lead to a different representation of reality and a different explanation for 
phenomena that happen within this reality (Walker & Schafer, 2006, p. 4). This had partly to 
do with the fact that during the Cold War, there was such a highly structured bipolar system 
that the choices of political leaders were indeed restricted, and it was more difficult for them 
to have a significant impact on the world stage (Hermann & Hagan, 1998, pp. 124-125; 
Walker & Schafer, 2006, p. 6).        
 However, after the Cold War had ended, the new world order became less structured, 
so that the influential IR theories were no longer sufficient to explain certain phenomena 
(Mintz, 2007, p. 169). Over the course of time, more studies have acknowledged that the 
personalities of political leaders can vary and not all individuals share exactly the same traits 
(Byman & Pollack, 2001, pp. 111-112). Political leaders can have different preferences that 
can have a varied influence on a state’s policies. It is believed that how leaders behave, is 
influenced by for example their cultural background and gender, the generation they are born 
into and what important events they have witnessed during their lifetime (Hermann & Hagan, 
1998, pp. 131-132). When trying to explain the last hundred years of history, it would make 
no sense to disregard certain important political leaders as if they did not have any relevance 
in it. Leaders like Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Saddam Hussein and Nelson Mandela, as well 
as every United States (U.S.) president, have had an important influence on the decisions that 
were made within their respective countries and on the world stage. Without them, history 
would have probably looked very different (Byman & Pollack, 2001, p. 108).  
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Leadership Trait Analysis 
Two valuable techniques can help study the impact of the individual level in IR. The first 
technique is the Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) designed by Margaret Hermann and used to 
determine the leadership style of political leaders and show how a particular leadership style 
can influence a leader’s foreign policy behaviour. A leadership style is about “the ways in 
which leaders relate to those around them – whether constituents, advisers, or other leaders – 
and how they structure interactions and the norms, rules, and principles they use to guide such 
interactions” (Hermann, 2003, p. 181). It is thus about how a political leader will behave in a 
certain situation because of his traits. Hermann created the LTA by doing inductive research 
from which she built a theory. In her first study, she came up with six personal characteristics 
of individual leaders that represent four broader types of personal characteristics (1980, p. 8). 
She focused on how these personal characteristics can have an influence on specific foreign 
policy behaviour and underlines that there are indeed visible relationships to detect (p. 41). 
For example, she concluded that there was a correlation visible between the degree of 
‘distrust to others’ a leader has and the degree of commitments their nations made. If a 
political leader has more distrust towards others, his nation will make fewer commitments to 
others (p. 34). Because there were multiple visible relationships, the study concludes with the 
statement that personal characteristics and orientations to foreign affairs of political leaders 
are worth focusing on when researching the behavior of states (p. 45).    
  In a later article, Hermann, together with Preston, builds on her first study by 
looking at how the leadership style of a president determines the kind of advisers he will 
choose and the relationship he will establish with these advisers (1994). In their article, they 
try to determine the influence of the leadership style of a president by looking at five traits 
that were obtained by the examination of earlier researches. These variables are then linked to 
three organizational functions and from these interrelations, four types of advisory systems 
presidents can use come forward. Hermann builds on this article when she looks at the first 
seven months of 42th U.S. president Bill Clinton’s term and how it has affected the authority 
and coordination within his advisory system (1994). In a later piece, Hermann (2003) evolved 
seven leadership traits that together constitute the personality of a political leader: the belief 
that one can influence or control what happens; the need for power and influence; conceptual 
complexity; self-confidence; task focus; general distrust or suspiciousness of others; and the 
intensity with which a person holds an in-group bias (p. 184). These traits are further 
elaborated in Table 1. The scores of these traits could then be compared to 122 political 
leaders from all over the world that were already analysed by Hermann. Focusing on those 
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leaders, it can be defined if a leader has a relatively high or low score on the trait compared to 
others. Together, these traits can give information on how leaders respond to constraints in 
their environment, how they process information and what motivates them to get into action 
(p. 186). Multiple scholars have used these seven traits in later studies (Shannon & Keller, 
2007; Görener and Ucal, 2011; Rohrer, 2014; Van Esch and Swinkels, 2015; Cuhadar, 
Kaarbo, Kesgin and Ozkececi-Taner, 2017) 
 
 
 
Operational Code Analysis 
The second technique that can be used to study the impact of individuals in IR is the 
Operational Code Analysis (OCA), which was mainly developed by Alexander George 
(1969). He was inspired by Nathan Leites’ study of the Bolshevik operational code that was 
published more than fifteen years before. In this study, Leites (1953) focussed on the 
principles of political tactics and strategies that shaped the classical Bolshevik approach to 
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politics. In his framework for the OCA, George (1969) focused specifically on a leader’s 
beliefs towards “the nature of politics and political conflict, his views regarding the extent to 
which historical developments can be shaped, and his notions of correct strategy and tactics” 
(p. 197). More specifically, the OCA is focused on five philosophical beliefs and five 
instrumental beliefs that can be identified by answering the ten questions that were generated 
by George (see Table 2). The five philosophical beliefs focus on the views a leader holds 
towards the political universe and other actors. The five instrumental beliefs mention a 
leader’s own preferences in terms of strategies and tactics (Walker, Schafer & Young, 2003, 
p. 217). Renshon (2008) conceptualizes these beliefs as structuring and ordering reality for 
decision makers “and helping them to sort the signals in their environment from the noise”. 
Furthermore, these beliefs have a great influence on how leaders interpret information, how 
they see their social environment and on how they make decisions (p. 821). The answers to 
George’s ten questions can thus elucidate the orientation a leader has towards the world and 
together form someone’s operational code. It is however important to note that George’s 
model does not include all beliefs and attitudes that can influence the behaviour of a political 
leader. A leader, just like every other person, has to simplify and structure the world around 
him in order to deal with specific situations and understand an otherwise complex reality 
(George, 1969, p. 197).        
 Dyson (2010) is one of the scholars that uses the OCA. He analyses the operational 
code of George W. Bush (GWB) and concludes that Bush’s distinctive personality and 
decision style were necessary conditions for the surge decision in Iraq. With this, he shows 
that Bush’s individual personality had an important impact on decisions that were made on 
the foreign policy level. Another example is the study of He and Feng (2013). They compare 
the operational codes of the secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping and 
his predecessor Hu Jintao. By this, they try to determine if and how China’s foreign policy 
will be different under Jinping. 
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One important difference between the OCA and the LTA is that there has not been much 
research within the LTA on how personalities can change over time or because of specific 
events. Most scholars see the stability of traits as a matter of course (Hermann, 1994; Keller, 
2005; Görener & Ucal, 2011). However, in recent years, some scholars within the OCA have 
adopted an alternative stance. From this stance emerged the assumption that beliefs could 
change because of several reasons (Walker et al., 1998; Renshon, 2008). One of these reasons 
is because of a traumatic event, which will be the focus of this thesis. Multiple scholars within 
the OCA used this focus to discover possible changes. Renshon (2008) for example concludes 
that a traumatic event, in this case the September 11 attacks, was able to permanently change 
the beliefs of former U.S. president GWB (p. 841). Furthermore, others have also used a 
traumatic event to show significant changes in the belief system of a political leader (Walker 
et al., 1998; Walker & Schafer, 2000; Feng, 2005; Robison, 2006). Even though the LTA and 
OCA are two different theoretical stances to focus on the impact of individuals on foreign 
policy decisions, the OCA can provide relevant information about change that can be applied 
to the LTA. This is because it is believed in this thesis that the two theoretical stances cohere 
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in more than one way. For example, one of Hermann’s seven leadership traits is in fact a 
belief: ‘belief in ability to control events’. How beliefs and traits exactly relate to each other 
will be elaborated in more detail later. Because there has been a lack of insights on change 
within LTA, this will be the focus of this thesis. This will be done by testing the stability of 
the theory in the aftermath of a traumatic event. Therefore, the first research question will be 
as follows: 
  
To what extent does the LTA of a political leader remain stable in the aftermath of a 
traumatic event?  
  
Additionally, this thesis will focus on the possible change of beliefs within the OCA. As was 
already briefly indicated, the LTA and OCA interrelate in multiple ways. Therefore, it can be 
interesting to see if similar patterns can be uncovered when using the same data for both 
theories. Furthermore, even though Lazarevska, Sholl and Young (2006) used both leadership 
traits and beliefs to resolve the question if there is a distinct terrorist personality (pp. 171-
172), there have not been any studies that separately analyse both the LTA and OCA of a 
leader with the same data and then compare the results with each other. Therefore, the second 
research question of this thesis will be: 
  
To what extent does the OCA of a political leader remain stable in the aftermath of a 
traumatic event?  
  
Both theories analyse a part of the personality of a leader, which in turn can explain a leader’s 
foreign policy decisions. However, when taken together, the results of both theories could 
give a more comprehensive view of why certain decisions are made. As Özdamar (2017) 
stated in his study on Islamist leaders: the LTA can be “an appropriate sphere in which to 
evaluate the operational code of the leader in terms of locating him or her within a specific 
typological model” (p. 186). By comparing the results of both theories with each other, 
similarities and differences between the theories can be detected. This could improve the 
ability to assess and predict the behaviour of political leaders when it comes to foreign policy. 
For example, there is no belief that is comparable to the trait ‘task focus’, which says 
something about the motivation for a leader to seek office (p. 197). On the other hand, the 
trait ‘distrust of others’ and the belief ‘nature of the political universe’ (P-1) are in accordance 
with each other and could thus complement each other, for the more hostile a leader will see 
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the political universe, the more distrustful he or she will probably be (Hermann, 2003, p. 202; 
Walker et al., 2003, p. 227). These examples show that when the LTA and OCA are both 
studied, it can give new insights on how these theories interrelate and can complement each 
other. Furthermore, they could perhaps give more comprehensive explanations about why 
political leaders make certain specific foreign policy decisions. 
 
Theoretical framework 
 
Stability and change 
Although much research has been done already on the leadership style and beliefs of political 
leaders, there has not been much attention on if and how these leadership styles and beliefs 
can change. For a long time, the field was dominated by the idea of cognitive consistency. For 
the OCA, the idea existed that “beliefs are stable over time, internally consistent and 
interdependent, and hierarchical” (Renshon, 2008, p. 823). This means that people feel a 
strong tendency to digest information in a way that conforms to their already existing beliefs, 
they will try to maintain internal cohesion within their belief system and that some beliefs are 
more resistant to change than others (Hermann, 1980, p. 10; Robison, 2006, p. 108; Renshon, 
2008, pp. 823-824). George (1969) based his analysis on these ideas. However, although his 
stance was supported by the results of some studies, not all examined belief systems turned 
out to be stable. This lack of stability was caused by for example the maturation of an 
individual, because of particular experiences or because of sensibility to change (Specht, 
Egloff & Schmulke, 2011, p. 862).       
 Therefore, some scholars adopted a different theoretical stance. From this stance 
emerged the assumption that beliefs can differ within a leader, depending on the issue he or 
she faces (see for example Walker & Schafer, 2000). Furthermore, it was recognized that the 
beliefs of leaders could change over time, which was referred to as ‘learning’, or because of a 
traumatic event (Walker et al., 1998; Renshon, 2008). Although there are thus different 
reasons that can cause a change of beliefs, this thesis will focus specifically on the possibility 
of change in the aftermath of a traumatic event, a term that will be conceptualized in more 
detail later. Renshon (2008) shows with his research that a change of role, as well as the 
experience of a traumatic event were able to change the belief system of U.S. president GWB. 
For instance, by looking at the operational code of the former president, he states that in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Bush’s beliefs changed significantly (pp. 836-837). 
He saw the political universe as being less friendly than before the attack, he was significantly 
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more negative when it came to the realization of his political goals, and his belief that there 
was an ability to predict the political future also saw a significant decline (p. 835). Robison 
(2006) too focused on the operational code of GWB in the aftermath of 9/11 and likewise, he 
evidenced some significant changes when it came to Bush’s beliefs (pp. 111-112). 
 Walker et al. (1998) also show that a leader’s beliefs can change in the aftermath of a 
traumatic event. When analysing the operational code of the 39th U.S. president Jimmy Carter, 
they concluded that his views remained relatively consistent in the first three years of his 
term. However, in the last year, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there were 
some statistically significant shifts in his views, especially with respect to the Soviet Union 
and other actors on the world stage, Furthermore his approach towards political action 
regarding the US-Soviet relations and other issues as well saw a significant change (p. 175). 
Another example is the study in which was tested if the beliefs of former leader of the 
Chinese Communist Party Mao Zedong changed in the aftermath of the Korean War in 1950 
(Feng, 2005). The results show that in fact all five of his philosophical beliefs changed 
because of the transition to war. This was mainly the result of the fact that Mao felt threatened 
because of American interference within this war, even though there were no direct intentions 
from the U.S. to invade China (p. 657). Although GWB, Jimmy Carter and Mao Zedong were 
all exposed to different types of events, a pattern can be unfolded that shows that the 
experience of a traumatic event can cause a significant change in the belief system of a 
political leader. 
  
Within the LTA, there has been much less focus on the possibility of change. Hermann does 
state that it is possible within the LTA to determine how stable the leadership traits of a 
particular leader are, for example by analysing data that focusses on someone’s full tenure in 
office or by analysing two periods with a specific situation, like a traumatic event or elections, 
in between (2003, pp. 206-207). However, she does not take up why she exactly believes that 
this is possible. Furthermore, Van Esch and Swinkels (2015) did conclude that the scores of 
some individual leaders appeared to be more changeable and did therefore not fit within the 
idea that a leadership style remains stable over time. However, they state that most individual 
LTA scores do remain relatively stable over time and context (p. 1210). Cuhadar, Kaarbo, 
Kesgin and Ozkececi-Taner (2017) concluded approximately the same. Even though there has 
thus been some focus on the possibility of change within LTA, in practice, most studies focus 
on the leadership style of a particular leader at a specific moment in time and do not have an 
interest in how a leadership style can change. Examples of this are the aforementioned study 
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of Hermann on the leadership style of U.S. president Bill Clinton (1994). By focusing on the 
first seven months of Clinton’s presidency, she tries to determine how his leadership style has 
affected the authority and coordination within his advisory system. Furthermore, Görener and 
Ucal measured the personality of current Turkish president Erdogan between 2004 and 2009 
when he was still the Turkish premier (2011). Besides these two examples, more studies show 
that there is not much focus on possible changes within an individual’s leadership style 
(Hermann & Preston, 1994; Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001; Keller, 2005). 
 Because the lack of research on changeability within the LTA, it is reasonable to 
glance at the literature on the OCA. Although the LTA and OCA are two different theories to 
analyse the personality of a political leader, there are some similarities to detect. First, both 
these theories focus on the impact an individual leader can have on the foreign policy 
decisions of a state. Furthermore, the OCA corresponds with the LTA, for what a leader 
believes, has an impact on how they relate to those around them and how they structure their 
interactions. Over the course of time, different studies within the field of psychology have 
shown how beliefs can have a direct influence on the behavioural traits of a political leader 
(Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). Moreover, as was already mentioned, one of Hermann’s seven 
traits is actually a belief, namely ‘the belief that one can influence or control what happens’ 
(Hermann, 2003, p. 184). In addition, ‘in-group bias’ and ‘distrust in others’, two other 
leadership traits, focus specifically on a leader’s motivation towards the rest of the world (pp. 
199 – 203). These two traits can be compared to the philosophical beliefs within the OCA that 
concentrate on how a leader determines the nature of the political universe and other actors 
(Walker et al., 2003, p. 217). These arguments show that, although the LTA and OCA are two 
different theories to explain the behaviour of individuals within IR, they are in fact 
interrelated. Because of this interrelation, it is expected that the leadership style of a political 
leader can change because it is already demonstrated that a leader’s belief system can change 
in the aftermath of a traumatic event. 
  
Traumatic event 
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), that is often 
used in the field of psychology, a traumatic event can be conceptualized as an experience 
“that involves threatened death or severe injury to an individual or witnessing an individual 
experience threatened death or severe injury”. It also particularizes that the individual in 
question must feel intense fear, helplessness, or horror because of the event. Traumatic events 
are thus physically severe, as well as psychological intense (Taylor & Weems, 2009, p. 91). 
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For this specific conceptualization, it is important to underline that a traumatic event does not 
always mean that the person himself has to be in physical pain. It can be traumatizing enough 
to see other people suffer (Edkins, 2003, p. 3).  
  
Research design 
  
To answer the given research questions, this study will focus on the possible personality 
changes of former U.S. president George W. Bush in the aftermath of 9/11. The September 11 
attacks can be labelled as traumatic for Bush, although he was nowhere near the attack. 
However, in the direct aftermath of the attacks, he felt frustrated and helpless and pictures of 
that day show that he was visibly affected by the attacks (May, 2011; Choi, 2016). 
Furthermore, in many ways it was not only a direct attack on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon, but also an attack on the U.S. as a whole. Because Bush was the head of state 
during the event, it can be argued that in some way, Bush was attacked directly. Because of 
these reasons, the September 11 attacks are a perfect example of a traumatic event 
experienced by GWB. By analysing the Bush’s leadership style, as well as his operational 
code before and in the aftermath of 9/11, possible significant changes for the LTA and OCA 
can be detected. This thesis will build on the study of Renshon (2008), who also chose to 
analyse the possible changes in Bush’s belief system in the aftermath of 9/11. Approximately 
the same time frame was used, but it was chosen to use spontaneous material instead of 
speeches. Why this choice was made will be elaborated later. 
 
To answer both research questions a quantitative content analysis will be done with the use of 
both the LTA and the OCA. These two techniques will be applied to the following two 
separate phases: 
  
1.     Phase 1: January 20, 2001 – September 10, 2001 
The first phase commences with the inauguration day of Bush’s first tenure as U.S. 
president on the 20th of January 2001. The phase ends approximately eight months 
later on September 10, 2001, the day before 9/11. 
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2.     Phase 2: September 11, 2001 – May 2, 2002 
The second phase starts on 9/11, when the attack on the World Trade Center in New 
York and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. took place. The phase ends on the 2nd of 
May 2002, likewise approximately eight months after the second phase started. 
  
By using these two phases, a clear distinction can be made between the traits and beliefs of 
Bush before 9/11 and in the aftermath of the event. After obtaining and analysing the data, the 
results of Phase 1 will be compared to those of Phase 2 for both the LTA and the OCA to see 
if the occurred changes are significant. This will be done with the use of an Independent 
Samples T-test. All data was analysed by using version 7.3.2. of Profiler Plus, which is an 
automated coding system. The main advantages of using Profiler Plus over coding by hand 
are that it is fast and efficient, while it also eliminates human biases and error. As Schafer and 
Walker put it: “automated coding gives us 100 percent coding reliability” (2006, pp. 38-39). 
For the LTA, Profiler Plus uses the seven leadership traits that were developed by Hermann 
(2003) and which were elaborated in Table 1. The scores of these seven traits can vary 
between 0 and 1 and are determined by the frequency that a political leader uses certain words 
or phrases. The higher someone scores on a specific trait, the more salient the content within 
this trait is to him (p. 186). For the OCA on the other hand, the program uses the Verbs in 
Context System (VICS) to retrieve the belief patterns of a political leader (Walker et al., 2003, 
p. 224). VICS is based on the five philosophical and five instrumental beliefs that were set up 
by George (1969) (see Table 2). The VICS codes sentences that contain verbs for 
directionality (where + means cooperative and – means conflictual) and for intensity (Schafer 
& Walker, 2006, p. 31).          
 For this content analysis, an ‘at-a-distance method’ was used. This means that the 
psychological characteristics of Bush can be assessed from a distance without having direct 
access to him (Schafer & Walker, 2006, p. 26). The used data for this research was mostly 
collected from the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, which offer the 
transcripts of public speeches and interviews with the media. Hermann states that a LTA can 
only be performed accurately when there are at least fifty interview responses with a 
minimum of one hundred words (Hermann, 2003, p. 180). This comes down to at least five-
thousand words. For an OCA on the other hand, most researchers assume that a minimum of 
1500 words per speech act or interview is necessary to carry out an accurate analysis (Schafer 
& Walker, 2006; Renshon, 2008). Furthermore, it is often suggested that the minimum 
amount of words that needs to be analysed when doing an OCA is five-thousand (Dyson, 
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2006, p. 293). For this thesis, it was chosen to only use interviews with a minimum of 
thousand words. Although this is a lower number than was suggested for doing an exact 
OCA, it is believed that this amount of words per interview will be enough, especially 
because the total amount of words largely transcends the required minimum for both the LTA 
and OCA. For the first phase, fourteen interviews were analysed with a total amount of 
27,057 words, while for the second phase, eighteen interviews were analysed with a total 
amount of 28,011 words.          
 Even though this thesis builds on Renshon’s study (2008), one main difference with 
his research is that this study will use interviews instead of speeches. Renshon believed that 
the use of interviews and speeches would give only slightly different results (p. 833). 
However, it is believed here that the use of interviews will be advantageous when it comes to 
the analysis of Bush’s traits and beliefs. First, interviews with the media are preferred because 
the responses within it are more spontaneous. Therefore, they will give a more comprehensive 
image of Bush’s personality than speeches, as he will have to respond quickly and with less 
preparation during an interview period (Hermann, 2003, p. 179). Furthermore, some studies 
have shown there can be relevant differences between the use of spontaneous and prepared 
statements, so it is more reliable to use interviews (Dille, 2000; Schafer & Crichlow, 2000; 
Schafer & Walker, 2006, p. 47). To make sure that the analysis will not be context-specific 
but will give a good impression of Bush’s full personality, it was attempted to include as 
many different topics as possible in different interview settings. Included are, for example, 
individual interviews, as well as interviews together with other political leaders, but also 
question-and-answer moments with children from elementary schools and interviews on his 
ranch while enjoying the outdoors. Furthermore, most studies in the field of LTA and OCA 
only focus on material on foreign policy (Hermann, 1980; Walker & Schafer, 2006; Renshon, 
2008). However, for this research it was chosen to include interviews that discuss a wider 
range of topics. These other topics also explain a part of the personality of a political leader, 
and therefore, it will give a more all-embracing view of Bush’s personality.  
  
Results 
 
Leadership Trait Analysis 
Table 3 shows the results of Bush’s LTA. Phase 1 shows the results of his leadership style 
before 9/11, while Phase 2 focuses on the period after the event. The numbers without 
parentheses show the scores of Bush’s leadership traits, while the scores within the 
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parentheses are the t-scores that were obtained by using the Independent Samples T-test. 
When looking at the change in leadership style of GWB, it is notable that most of his traits do 
not change significantly. However, there are two exceptions: the traits ‘in-group bias’ and 
‘distrust towards others’. As was already mentioned, these two traits focus specifically on 
what a leader’s motivation is towards the rest of the world. First, there was a significant 
change for the trait ‘in-group bias’ (t (28,89) = -2,15, p = 0,04, r = 0,37). According to 
Hermann, “in-group bias is a view to the world in which one’s group (social, political, ethnic, 
etc.) holds center stage” (2003, p. 201). When a leader scores high on this trait, he will make 
decisions that are in favour of his own group. When it comes to Bush his behaviour after 9/11, 
it can thus be said that he has a significant higher tendency to favour his own group in 
comparison to the period before the attacks. When the results for this trait are put in context 
by comparing them to the reference group of 284 world leaders that was given by Cuhadar et 
al. (2017), it can be concluded that Bush scores medium on this trait. This thesis assumes that 
when the score of a leader falls one standard deviation below or above the means given by 
Cuhadar et al., his score can be labelled as low or high. As can be seen in Table 3, Bush’s 
score on ‘in-group bias’ has gone up from 0,09 to 0,13 after 9/11. The mean of the reference 
group for this trait is somewhat higher, namely 0,15 with a standard deviation of 0,05 (p. 47). 
By comparing these results, it can be stated that Bush became more biased towards his own 
group in the aftermath of September 11, as his score shifted from the low category in the 
direction of the mean. Furthermore, when focussing on effect size (r), the score of the change 
from the first to the second phase is 0,37, which shows that the change had a medium to high 
effect.            
 A second significant change can be seen when analysing the trait ‘distrust of others’ (t 
(29,76) = -4,88, p < 0,01, r = 0,67). A leader who scores high on this trait often feels wary, 
uneasy and suspicious towards others. He or she will often misdoubt the intentions and 
actions of others (Hermann, 2003, p. 202). Table 3 shows that Bush’s score on this trait has 
gone up significantly from 0,12 to 0,33. From this, it can be stated that the former president 
became significantly more suspicious and distrustful in the aftermath of the September 11 
attacks. Furthermore, when comparing these results to the results to the reference group of 
Cuhadar et al. (2017), it shows that Bush had an average score on this trait before 9/11, as the 
average score for the 284 world leaders was 0,13 with a standard deviation of 0,06. However, 
after the attacks took place, his score can be categorized has high as his score was more than 
one standard deviation above the mean (p. 47). Therefore, it can be said that Bush had 
significantly more distrust in the aftermath of 9/11 when comparing him to other world 
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leaders. When regarding the effect size (r) of this score, the effect of the change is 0,67, which 
can be labelled as a high effect.  
  
 
 
Operational Code Analysis 
Just like the results of Bush’s LTA, Phase 1 shows the operational codes for the period before 
9/11, while Phase 2 focuses on the scores in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. The scores 
that are not in parentheses show the scores for Bush’s operational codes, while the scores 
within the parentheses show the t-scores that were obtained by using the Independent Samples 
T-test. When focusing on the philosophical beliefs, multiple significant changes in the belief 
system of GWB can be uncovered. The first significant change can be uncovered when 
concentrating on ‘predictability of political future’ (P-3) (t (21,74) = 2,53, p = 0,02, r = 0,48). 
After the 9/11 attacks had taken place, his score decreased from 0,21 to 0,15, which shows 
that he saw the political future as being less predictable (Walker et al., 2003, p. 230). The 
effect size of this change is 0,48, which can be determined as being a medium to high effect. 
A significant change can also be seen for ‘control over historical development’ (P-4) (t 
(21,87) = 2,50, p = 0,02, r = 0,48). The score of this belief dropped from 0,60 to 0,44, which 
indicates that Bush believed that he had less control over historical developments after 9/11 
than before. However, he still has an average score (p. 228). The effect size of the change of 
this belief is also 0,48, like the effect size of P-3, which means that the effect of this change 
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can also be determined as being medium to high. The last philosophical belief that has 
changed significantly is the ‘role of chance’ (P-5) (t (24,52) = -3,96, p = 0,01, r = 0,62). 
Bush’s score on this belief increased from 0,88 to 0,93, which shows that he already attributed 
a great role to chance before 9/11 and that this attribution only got bigger after the attacks. 
This belief takes into account the aforementioned two philosophical beliefs P-3 and P-4. The 
higher the scores on the two mentioned beliefs, the lower the role of chance will play (Walker 
et al., 2003, p. 230). In the case of George W. Bush, it can be seen that the scores of both 
beliefs decreased, while the role of chance increased in the aftermath of the attacks. 
Furthermore, the effect size (r) of this change is 0,62, which means that the effect of the 
change between the results before and after the September 11 attacks can be labelled as high. 
 There are also some significant changes to uncover when analysing Bush’s 
instrumental beliefs. First, his ‘tactical pursuit of goals’ (I-2) saw a significant decline from 
0,25 to 0,09 (t (28,66) = 3,04, p < 0,01, r = 0,49). This shows that although Bush still has a 
tendency towards cooperation instead of conflict when it comes to the realisation of his goals, 
this tendency has attenuated compared to the period before 9/11 (p. 227). Furthermore, the 
effect size (r) of this change can be labelled as being medium to high. The next instrumental 
belief that saw a significant change is ‘utility of means’ (I-5), or more specifically, all three 
conflict means: punishment, threats and opposition / resistance. The cooperation means on the 
other hand remained stable. The trait ‘utility of means’ can be analysed proportionately, so by 
comparing all the scores to each other, or simply by their descriptors (p. 229). It was here 
chosen to use the last form of analysis. Focusing on the conflict means, it can be noticed that 
Bush’s belief in the utility of punishments increased (I-5a) (t (26,55) = -3,53, p < 0,01, r = 
0,57). Second, he also believed that threats were more useful in the aftermath of the 
September 11 attacks (I-5b) (t (25,21) = -2,49, p = 0,02, r = 0,44). On the other hand, there 
was a significant diminution in Bush’s belief in the utility of opposition / resistance (I-5c) (t 
(18,92) = 2,18, p = 0,04, r = 0,45). Focusing on the effect size of these three means, it can be 
seen that the effect of the change of both threats and opposition / resistance can be labelled as 
medium to high. On the other hand, the effect of change for punishments can be labelled as 
high.  
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Discussion 
 
Now that both Bush’s leadership style and operational code are analysed, it is tried to answer 
the two given research questions and connect them to each other. Because of the limited scope 
of this thesis, it was chosen to only focus on the traits and beliefs that saw a significant 
change. The first research question focused on if the LTA of a political leader remains stable 
in the aftermath of a traumatic event. After analysing the leadership style of former president 
Bush before and in the aftermath of 9/11, it can be concluded that two of his seven traits, 
namely ‘in-group bias’ and ‘distrust towards others’, saw a significant change. When 
comparing Bush’s scores with the reference group of Cuhadar et al., it can be seen that both 
these traits changed category, as was already shown in the analysis. Although there is a 
significant change for only two of the seven traits, it can be stated that this could have at least 
partly led to a change in Bush’s overall leadership style, because of these category changes. 
From these results, it can be concluded that the leadership style of a political leader does not 
always remain stable in the aftermath of a traumatic event and that the model of cognitive 
consistency is thus not always comprehensive enough to explain the leadership style of an 
individual. Even though this thesis has shown that the leadership style of GWB was indeed 
able to change, more research needs to be done to determine if these results could be 
generalized to other political leaders that have dealt with a traumatic event of any kind. 
However, that is beyond the scope of this thesis.       
 The second research question focused on the extent to which the OCA of a political 
leader remains stable in the aftermath of a traumatic event. It was concluded that in the case 
of GWB, five out of ten of his traits saw a significant change. However, it is important to 
determine if these operational codes are in any way coherent with the leadership traits that 
changed significantly. Within the LTA, the leadership style of Bush saw a significant increase 
for the traits ‘in-group bias’ and ‘distrust towards others’. According to Hermann, political 
leaders are more likely to perceive threats from the environment and confront those 
responsible for these threats when they score high on both these traits (2003, pp. 200-201). As 
was already mentioned, these two traits are comparable to the philosophical beliefs within the 
OCA, as both focus on how a leader sees the world around him. When the results for the OCA 
would show a similar pattern to those of the LTA, it could be expected that all philosophical 
beliefs would show a significant change, while the institutional beliefs would remain mostly 
stable. This accords with Renshon’s hypothesis (2008, pp. 830-831), although his actual study 
only showed a significant change for P-1 and P-2 (p. 834). Robison (2006), who also 
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researched GWB’s operational code in the aftermath of 9/11, had the same results as Renshon 
when focusing on the philosophical beliefs (p. 111). The current study however does not 
match the results of both Renshon and Robison, as a significant change for only P-3, P-4 and 
P-5 can be seen. This means that in the aftermath of 9/11 Bush believed that the political 
future was less predictable (P-3), that he had less control over historical development (P-4) 
and that he was convinced that chance got a bigger role (P-5). The results of these three 
philosophical beliefs do correspond with the traits that saw a significant change, as those have 
indicated that Bush saw the world in a more negative way and became more confrontational 
in the aftermath of 9/11. Both the results of Bush’s OCA and LTA thus show a similar stand, 
as all discussed beliefs and traits show that his view towards the world became more 
pessimistic.          
 Besides, it can be argued that these three beliefs can be linked to other traits. For 
example, the belief ‘the political future is predictable’ (P-3) indicates that when this belief is 
high, a political leader will likely take the lead, instead of waiting passively. Furthermore, the 
belief ‘the control over historical development’ (P-4) is about how much influence a political 
leader believes to have on historical events and outcomes (George, 1969, p. 204). Both these 
beliefs can be connected to the trait ‘belief in one’s own ability to control events’, which can 
be described as a view of the world in which leaders have some degree of control over 
situations in which they find themselves (Hermann, 2003, pp. 188-189). However, although 
both the score of the discussed beliefs and trait show a decrease after September 11, there was 
only a significant change for the belief-scores.      
 While Renshon did not find significant changes for any of Bush’s instrumental beliefs, 
Robison did saw a significant change for I-1 and I-2, which indicates that Bush preferred 
conflict over cooperation in the aftermath of the attacks (2006, pp. 111-112). His results for I-
2 correspond with the results of this thesis, which also saw a significant change for this belief. 
Bush’s score on the belief ‘tactical pursuit of goals’ (I-2) shows that although he is still 
focused on using ‘somewhat cooperative tactics’ in the aftermath of 9/11, his score dropped 
significantly and he increasingly inclined towards using more conflicting tactics (Walker et 
al., 2003, pp. 227-228). Furthermore, the current study also saw a significant change in the 
instrumental belief ‘utility of means’ (I-5), which is in contrast to both Renshon’s and 
Robison’s study. Two of the three conflict means, namely ‘punishments’ and ‘threats’, saw a 
significant increase, which indicates that Bush saw more utility in using punishments and 
threats in the aftermath of September 11. However, his score for ‘oppose / resist’ declined, 
which suggests that Bush’s expression of opposition / resistance decreased. The results of 
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both I-2 and I-5 can be partially linked to the significant changes of the two aforementioned 
traits, as a more negative approach of a political leader towards the world will make their 
respective state more confrontational. Besides, it will also lead to more engagement in 
economic sanctions and military interventions, which can be seen as punishments and threats 
(Hermann, 2003, pp. 199-200).       
 Lastly, although it was not the main purpose of this thesis to analyse this, it must be 
noted that, when comparing the results of this OCA to that of Renshon (2008) and Robison 
(2006), it is striking that there are differences between the outcomes. Renshon also focused on 
the impact of 9/11 on the operational code of GWB and only found a significant change for 
two philosophical beliefs (2008, p. 834). Robison on the other hand only found a significant 
change for two philosophical and two instrumental beliefs (2006, pp. 111-112). However, in 
this thesis a significant change can be found for five out of the ten beliefs while using 
approximately the same timeframe. The main difference between this study and that of 
Renshon and Robison is that they both used public speeches, while this thesis used 
spontaneous material in the form of interviews. While Robison did not specify why he chose 
to use speeches, Renshon believed that spontaneous and prepared statements would generate 
approximately the same results. However, the differences between his and this analysis show 
otherwise. This could indicate that there are indeed significant differences between the use of 
prepared and spontaneous material, as was already suggested by various studies (Dille, 2000; 
Schafer & Chrichlow, 2000; Schafer & Walker, 2006, p. 47). It is possible that prepared 
material does not give an equally complete image of Bush’s personality as spontaneous 
material. However, examining why these different results occurred exactly is beyond the 
scope of this research.  
 
Conclusion 
This thesis has examined the stability and change of the LTA as well as the OCA by focusing 
on George W. Bush. Although only two of the seven leadership traits saw a significant change 
in the aftermath of 9/11, it is stated that not only Bush’s traits, but also his leadership style 
saw a significant change in the aftermath of 9/11. Furthermore, the analysis has also 
elaborated that five out of ten of Bush’s beliefs have shown a significant change. The results 
of both these theories show that the idea of cognitive consistency is not always tenable when 
focusing on the impact of a traumatic event on the personality of a political leader.
 Furthermore, the discussion has tried to show how beliefs and traits can relate to each 
other. Because of the limited scope of this thesis, it was chosen to only focus on the traits and 
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beliefs that saw a significant change in the aftermath of 9/11. The results of this thesis partly 
match the idea that the traits ‘in-group bias’ and ‘distrust to others’ correspond with the five 
philosophical beliefs, as P-3, P-4 and P-5 saw a significant change in the same direction. 
Furthermore, these philosophical beliefs were also linked to another trait, namely ‘belief in 
one’s own ability to control events’. However, this trait did not saw a significant change. For 
the instrumental beliefs, this thesis found significant changes for both I-2 and I-5. These 
results could also be linked partly to the results of the traits ‘in-group bias’ and ‘distrust to 
others’, for the more negative someone considers the world around him to be, the more he 
will use conflictual instead of cooperative means towards this world. However, these results 
did not match those of Renshon (2008) and Robison (2006), who also analysed the 
operational code of GWB in the aftermath of 9/11. Perhaps this was because of the fact that 
they both analysed speeches, while this thesis used interviews. However, this can only be 
stated with certainty when more research will be done on it.    
 Analysing the same data with both the LTA and OCA and then comparing the results 
is something that has almost never been done. However, it was concluded in this thesis that 
some of Hermann’s traits are not appointed within George’s beliefs and vice versa. 
Furthermore, it was shown that some beliefs and traits complement each other in some ways. 
Using both the LTA and OCA could thus give a more comprehensive view of how the 
personality of a leader could have an influence on foreign policy decisions. However, because 
of the limited scope of this thesis, it was not yet possible to gain a complete picture of all 
ways in which the LTA and OCA interrelate. Furthermore, this study only focused on 
traumatic events and did not include any other possible reasons why the leadership style or 
operational code of a political leader can change. Besides, the focus was specifically on the 
personality of GWB in the aftermath of 9/11, so that the results cannot be generalized to other 
political leaders. More extensive research is therefore necessary.  
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Appendix A 
Phase 1 (interview fragments prior to 9/11) 
#1: Interview ABC News, 04/26/2001, 1196 words 
https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=127022&page=1 
#2: Interview with Time, 04/27/2001, 1700 words 
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,107844,00.html 
#3: Conference with the president of Poland, 06/15/2001, 1188 words 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book1/pdf/PPP-2001-book1-doc-pg670.pdf 
#4: Conference with Vladimir Putin, 06/16/2001, 1450 words 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book1/pdf/PPP-2001-book1-doc-pg685.pdf 
#5: Conference with Tony Blair, 07/19/2001, 1423 words  
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg873.pdf 
#6: Prior to meeting with the Virginia Gubernatorial candidate, 07/26/2001, 1217 words 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg913.pdf 
#7: While signing an Executive Order on Energy Efficiency, 07/31/2001, 1025 words 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg930.pdf 
#8: Exchange with reporters in Waco, Texas, 08/07/2001, 1077 words 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg944.pdf 
#9: Exchange with reporters in Crawford, 08/13/2001, 1695 words 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg960.pdf 
#10: Q&A on an elementary school, 08/15/2001, 1431 words 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg974-2.pdf 
#11: Remarks on Q&A with students at elementary school, 08/23/2001, 2748 words 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1010.pdf 
#12: Exchange with reporters on Bush Ranch, 08/25/2001, 8182 words 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1029.pdf 
#13: Prior to meeting with Senate Minority Leader, 09/04/2001, 1283 words 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1070.pdf 
#14: With the president of Mexico, 09/06/2001, 1442 words 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1078.pdf 
 
Phase 2 (interview fragments after 9/11) 
#15: Arrival at the White House, 09/16/2001, 1224 words 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1114.pdf 
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#16: Remarks to employees in the Pentagon, 09/17/2001, 1208 words 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1117-2.pdf 
#17: Prior to discussions with the president of Indonesia, 09/19/2001, 1297 words 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1129.pdf 
#18: About financial sanctions against terrorists and supporters, 09/24/2001, 1978 words 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1149.pdf 
#19: After discussions with the prime minister of Japan, 09/25/2001, 1073 words 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1157-2.pdf 
#20: Following discussions with business leaders, 10/03/2001, 1535 words 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1184.pdf 
#21: After discussions with the Chancellor of Germany, 10/09/2001, 2131 words 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1206.pdf 
#22: After meeting with the Homeland Security Council, 10/29/2001, 1056 words 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1317.pdf 
#23: After discussions with the President of Nigeria, 11/02/2001, 1559 words 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1337.pdf 
#24: Q&A with high school students with Putin, 11/15/2001, 2691 words 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1409.pdf 
#25: At a ceremony for rescued humanitarian aid workers, 11/26/2001, 1315 words 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1443.pdf 
#26: Remarks on the new Oval Office carpet, 12/21/2001, 1963 words 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1534-2.pdf 
#27: After roundtable discussion on retirement savings, 03/01/2002, 1150 words 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2002-book1/pdf/PPP-2002-book1-doc-pg312.pdf 
#28: After remarks on the situation in the Middle East, 03/07/2002, 1224 words 
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